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Introduction
In response to the financial crisis the Bank of England, along
with other authorities, acted to underpin confidence in the
banking system.  As part of this response the Bank, in common
with other central banks, expanded some of its existing
operations and introduced new facilities to provide liquidity
insurance to the banking system.  In particular, the Bank
broadened the range of collateral accepted in these facilities to
include certain forms of high-quality private sector assets,
notably residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and
covered bonds.
When the Bank lends funds in its operations, it does so against
collateral in order to protect itself against counterparty credit
risk:  whenever funds are lent, the lender takes on the risk that
the borrower may not repay.  But it is not part of the Bank’s
objectives to take on credit risk via its operations, and the
consequence of a significant loss could harm its credibility,
threaten its independence and impair its ability to discharge its
statutory responsibilities.  Although the credit risk in lending
can never be zero, by taking collateral of sufficient quantity
and quality, the Bank is able to significantly reduce the risk of a
material loss arising in the event of a counterparty default.
This article sets out how the Bank undertakes collateral risk
management in order to demonstrate how it protects its
balance sheet.  The Bank does not publish the detailed risk
information used as inputs in determining the valuations and
haircuts applied to individual items of collateral taken, not
least because of practical and legal constraints.  Instead, this
article sets out the high-level principles that drive how the
Bank approaches risk management, outlining the policies and
procedures through which it protects its balance sheet.  The
Bank forms its own independent view of the risks in the
collateral taken.  It supplements this analysis with various
sources of information, including the rating agencies, but the
Bank does not rely on such ratings.
As background, the next section describes the Bank’s liquidity
insurance operations and the principles underlying its
collateral policy.  The article then describes how the Bank
undertakes collateral risk management through the three basic
tools of eligibility, valuations and haircuts, illustrating that
risks would only crystallise in very extreme stress scenarios.
Liquidity insurance and collateral policy 
The Bank’s provision of liquidity insurance contributes to the
stability of the financial system.  Commercial banks and
building societies provide important services that benefit the
economy, providing payment services and transforming
short-maturity deposits into longer-maturity loans to
households and businesses.  But this exposes the banks to
liquidity risks, for example if a sudden loss of confidence leads
to depositors withdrawing their deposits at short notice.  To
help contain the costs to the wider economy of a
crystallisation of these liquidity risks, the Bank provides
liquidity insurance by being prepared to lend to banks against
good-quality collateral. 
The Bank’s liquidity insurance operations have been at the
heart of the Bank’s response to the financial crisis.(2) Table A
provides an overview of the key features of these operations.
Of these, the Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS) and US dollar
repo operations are temporary additional facilities, introduced
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to address specific market dislocations.(1) Other new facilities
— the extended-collateral long-term repos (ELTRs) and
Discount Window Facility (DWF) — will be permanent, as
described in detail in the October 2008 consultation paper
(Bank of England (2008)).  In addition to these public facilities,
the Bank also provided bilateral emergency liquidity assistance
(ELA) to some institutions, as described in more detail later in
the article.
Prior to the financial crisis, the Bank accepted as collateral in
its operations only certain highly rated sovereign and
supranational debt — which we will refer to as ‘narrow’
collateral.  One of the biggest changes to the Bank’s provision
of liquidity insurance was the broadening of the collateral
accepted to include private sector assets — ‘extended’
collateral.(2) As shown by Chart 1, the majority of such
collateral has been in the form of RMBS and covered bonds.  In
response to the financial crisis some other central banks, such
as the Federal Reserve in the United States, also introduced
new facilities in which a broader range of collateral was
accepted.  Others, such as the European Central Bank, entered
the crisis already accepting a broad range of collateral in its
routine operations, including private sector assets such as
RMBS and covered bonds.(3)
At times of financial stress, central banks have traditionally
been prepared to lend against a wider range of collateral.  In
launching its new permanent facilities the Bank took the
decision that it would be prepared to accept extended
collateral in its liquidity insurance operations in routine
fashion.  This was aimed at ensuring that the Bank’s liquidity
insurance framework is consistent through time, by giving the
market clarity on the terms on which the Bank will lend, both
in normal times and, importantly, in times of stress. 
(1) For a discussion of the rationale for the temporary nature of SLS, see King (2010).
(2) Extended collateral also includes a broader range of public sector assets than
accepted before the crisis, including for example debt issued by
government-guaranteed agencies.
(3) For a comparison of the collateral frameworks of these central banks, see Cheun et al
(2009).
RMBS
  (£161.9 billion)
Covered bonds
  backed by
  residential
  mortgages
  (£77.9 billion)
ABS(c)
  (£17.6 billion)
Other(b)
  (£18.0 billion)
Total:  £275.4 billion
Chart 1 Extended collateral taken by the Bank(a)
(a) Holdings by market value as at 30 January 2009 (which was when the SLS drawdown window
closed, and was around the peak of collateral holdings across all operations).
(b) ‘Other’ includes various eligible asset types, such as commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS), bank debt guaranteed under HM Government’s bank debt guarantee scheme, and
debt issued by government-guaranteed agencies.
(c) ABS include securities backed by credit card receivables and other consumer debt.
Table A Summary of liquidity insurance operations in which extended collateral is accepted
Operation/facility Type of operation Cost of borrowing Collateral accepted Date introduced Date facility closes Peak value of
lending 
outstanding
Extended-collateral Auctions of sterling   Rate paid depends on bids ‘Narrow’ (sovereign and December 2007.  Permanent. £180 billion, 
long-term repos cash at term of three received, with different rates supranational) collateral 9 January 2009. 
months.  New auction  paid on borrowing against plus ‘extended’ collateral,
design (including auctions  ‘narrow’ and ‘extended’  including AAA-rated 
at six-month maturity) collateral. RMBS, covered bonds and 
to be implemented certain asset-backed
in 2010, with the  securities (ABS);  widened
operations to be termed  further in September 2008
‘indexed long-term repos’ to include securitisations
— for details see the box of commercial mortgages
on pages 90–91 of this and corporate bonds and
Bulletin. loans.
Special Liquidity Facility to allow  Three-month Libor  Extended collateral, April 2008. Drawdown period £185 billion, 
Scheme  counterparties to swap minus the three-month  including AAA-rated RMBS, closed end-January 30 January 2009.
illiquid assets for liquid general collateral gilt covered bonds, and credit   2009;  last swaps
UK Treasury bills for a  repo rate, subject to a card ABS;  assets must have  will terminate
term of up to three   floor of 20 basis points. been held on the end-January 2012.
years. counterparty’s balance sheet
at end-2007.
US dollar repo Lending of dollar cash at Variable-rate auctions of fixed  Same as for ELTRs. September 2008. Closed end-January $86 billion, 
operations terms of 7, 28 and 84 days. size (up until October 2008);  2010;  reintroduced  17 October 2008.
fixed-rate tenders of unlimited on 10 May 2010.
size thereafter.
Discount Window  On-demand bilateral    Rate charged depends on  Narrow collateral plus  October 2008. Permanent. Zero usage up to 
Facility   facility to lend gilts (or,  amount borrowed and type broader range of extended   31 December 2009
exceptionally, cash) at a  of collateral provided. collateral than accepted    (the Bank publishes
term usually of 30 days. in ELTRs, including ABS    DWF usage with a
rated higher than A3      lag).
provided they were rated    
AAA at issue.  The Bank has    
proposed to extend further  
the range of collateral to 
include unsecuritised loans. 96 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q2
The benefits of offering liquidity insurance must be balanced
against the cost of reducing incentives for banks to manage
liquidity risk prudently, and subject to the need to minimise
the risk taken onto the Bank’s balance sheet.  The design of the
Bank’s permanent liquidity insurance facilities — crucially, the
terms on which it will lend — aims to meet these two
requirements as follows.(1)
To balance against the cost of creating incentives for banks to
take excessive liquidity risk, the prices paid for borrowing are
designed to be attractive only in stressed conditions.  In this
way, the Bank remains lender of last resort rather than lender
of first resort.  For example, in the DWF the rate charged is set
at levels that, in normal market conditions, should make banks
prefer to find alternative financing arrangements.  The rate
charged also increases as a bank’s borrowing increases and/or
is made against less liquid collateral, helping to incentivise
banks to manage liquidity risk prudently.
To minimise the risk taken onto its balance sheet, the Bank
aims to exclude from its public facilities any bank whose
solvency or viability is seriously in question.  To protect its
balance sheet further, the Bank accepts as collateral only
instruments it can risk-manage effectively.  In particular,
through its collateral valuations and haircuts, the Bank aims to
leave the financial risks associated with the collateral with the
counterparty, so that the Bank is only providing liquidity
against the collateral, and not a subsidy for its underlying
credit risk.(2)
These principles are in keeping with Bagehot’s dictum from
over a century ago that, to avert panic, central banks should
lend early and freely to solvent firms, against good collateral
and at high rates (see Bagehot (1873)).
Collateral risk management at the Bank of
England
The Bank has increased its capacity to manage the new types
of risk associated with the broader range of collateral now
accepted in its operations.  In particular, it has undertaken
extensive work to enhance its risk management processes
governing the securities accepted as collateral.  This has
included an increase in the Bank’s risk management staff
numbers, including hires from the private sector with relevant
expertise.  The Bank has also drawn on external advice when
necessary, for example in advising on the design of an
enhanced collateral risk monitoring system.
The Bank has available to it three basic tools with which it can
manage the risks associated with the collateral it takes in its
operations:  (i) eligibility — what collateral the Bank will lend
against;  (ii) valuations — how much the collateral is worth;
and (iii) haircuts — how much the Bank will lend relative to the
value of the collateral.  The Bank risk manages collateral using
the same principles across all its operations, and aims to treat
its counterparties fairly and consistently.  The remainder of this
section addresses each of the Bank’s three risk management
tools in turn.
Eligibility
Eligibility is the highest level risk management tool.  Securities
whose risk cannot be easily assessed, or managed through
valuations and haircuts, are simply made ineligible so they are
not allowed to be used as collateral with the Bank.  
The Bank publishes high-level collateral eligibility criteria for
its operations, which set a baseline for the quality of collateral
accepted.(3) By restricting eligibility to certain asset types, the
Bank accepts only securities whose structures it can
understand at reasonable cost, and whose intrinsic risks it can
quantify and easily manage.  For example, the Bank only
accepts commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) that
are backed by a sufficiently diversified pool of commercial
properties.
The first step in the eligibility checking process is therefore to
determine whether a security meets the high-level eligibility
criteria.  Ratings assigned by the rating agencies play a role in
establishing minimum standards of credit quality for the
securities accepted, but they are indicative only, giving a public
statement about where the Bank’s criteria are set.  The Bank
undertakes its own independent analysis of securities
submitted for eligibility checking and may deem a security
ineligible even if it has the publicly stated ratings.  For
example, the Bank may not wish to accept securities with
certain structural features, such as where third parties may be
able to exercise control of the transaction to the detriment of
the Bank’s interests.  Conversely, in the event of a downgrade
of a security below a minimum-rating criterion, the Bank may
allow it to remain eligible as collateral if the Bank believes it
remains of sufficient quality.
Some of the securities taken as collateral by the Bank during
the crisis already existed and were traded in the market.  These
securities have been ‘market tested’ and the Bank is just one of
many noteholders.  Provided the Bank’s review of such a
security concludes that it meets the eligibility criteria and has
a well-understood structure with no unusual features and no
concerns over its performance, it is deemed eligible.  Ongoing
compliance with the eligibility criteria, including current
ratings, is checked on a daily basis.
But a large proportion of the securities taken have been
created specifically for use as collateral with the Bank by the
(1) For further details of the principles underlying the Bank’s collateral policy, see Bank of
England (2008) and Tucker (2009).
(2) An additional layer of protection for the Bank’s balance sheet is provided in some
operations, for example the SLS, by an explicit indemnity from the Treasury.
(3) For details of current eligibility criteria for the Bank’s operations, see
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originator of the underlying assets, and have therefore not
been traded in the market.  Such ‘own-name’ securities
accounted for around 76% of the Bank’s extended collateral
(around the peak of usage in January 2009), and form the
overwhelming majority of collateral taken in the SLS.  These
securities undergo a detailed evaluation, including a
committee review process, to determine eligibility.  This
involves a thorough legal review of the transaction
documentation to ensure that the structure is legally robust
and at least as sound as that of similar securities that have
been issued into the market.  Counterparties may be asked to
bear the legal costs of such reviews.  A detailed assessment of
the credit quality of the underlying assets is also carried out,
including through the use of stress testing.  The Bank only
confirms eligibility of a security once it has been issued, but
engages with the issuer before issuance to identify any unusual
features it is not comfortable with and which may — if not
addressed — result in the security being ineligible.
The performance of all eligible securities is monitored on an
ongoing basis through investor reports and other sources,
including the rating agencies and other data providers.
Securities whose performance deteriorates are investigated
further to determine if any mitigating action is required.  This
could include making a security ineligible, in which case any
counterparty that has submitted it as collateral has to replace
it with alternative eligible collateral.  As well as monitoring
individual securities, the Bank monitors developments in the
broader market, including through market contacts, broker
research and other news sources.
The information generally disclosed on asset-backed securities
varies considerably, both within and across asset classes,
making it difficult to assess ongoing performance.  To improve
the efficiency of its risk management of these assets, as well as
to bring greater transparency to the market, the Bank has
proposed to make it an eligibility requirement that issuers
disclose more information about them (see Bank of England
(2010a)).  This would include granular information on the
underlying assets, as well as greater transparency around the
structure of the securities. 
Valuations
The Bank’s valuation of collateral plays a key role in protecting
the Bank against loss in the event of a counterparty default.
The value assigned to a security, together with the haircut
applied, determines how much the Bank will lend against it.  If
the counterparty then fails to repay when due, the Bank would
plan to sell the collateral in due course (subject to market
conditions) to make good the loss.  It is therefore important
that the Bank’s valuation of a security reflects as accurately as
possible its current market price.
The Bank revalues its collateral on a daily basis to ensure it
remains protected in this way.  If the aggregate
haircut-adjusted value of a counterparty’s collateral falls below
the value of liquidity provided, a margin call is made whereby
the counterparty is required to either provide more collateral
or, if appropriate, return some of the lent funds.
Where available, the Bank uses market prices to value a
security, since that is the price at which a market participant
has bought, or has indicated that it is willing to buy, the
security.  The market price must be from a publicly available
source that is reliable and independent of the counterparty
delivering the security.  The Bank uses a range of pricing data
sources, which it keeps under continuous review.  The Bank
may use its discretion to override such prices if it believes they
may no longer be accurate.  For example, following the
announcement that Northern Rock’s RMBS programme,
Granite, had hit a non-asset trigger,(1) the Bank adjusted its
prices immediately — based on its analysis and supplemented
by discussions with market participants — rather than waiting
for observed quoted prices to change.
Where no market price is available or those that are available
are judged to be unreliable, for example because they are
dated, the Bank calculates a model price to value a security.
Given the large proportion of collateral comprised of
own-name securities created specifically for use in the Bank’s
facilities, around 84% of the Bank’s extended collateral was
model-priced (around the peak of usage in January 2009).  To
ensure valuation consistency between market and
model-priced securities the Bank’s internal valuation process is
designed to assign a model price that replicates as closely as
possible what a market price would be, had there been one.
To model-price a security the Bank uses a standard bond
pricing model to discount expected future cash flows using
implied market rates.  
Securitisations often have uncertain cash flows which must
therefore be estimated.  For example, ‘pass-through’ securities
are paid down as principal from the underlying loans is
received, the timing of which cannot be predicted with
certainty (for example, mortgages may be paid off early when
borrowers remortgage).  The Bank estimates these cash flows
on the basis of historical information and performance data
(such as loan prepayment rates) provided by the issuer,
together with data on similar securities in the market.  For
securities with call options, the Bank forms its own judgement
on whether to give credit to the call in its valuations.(2) For
own-name securities where the counterparty submitting the
collateral is also the originator of the collateral, the Bank will
(1) The non-asset trigger effectively results in a wind-down of the programme, with notes
issued from it paid down on an amortising basis (ie as the underlying mortgages pay
down).  This affects the expected maturity of the notes, and hence their prices.
(2) To give investors greater certainty about the maturity of securities, a common feature
of securitisations is a ‘call option’ whereby the issuer may redeem the bonds on a
specified date.  This ‘call date’ is often taken as the expected maturity of the
securities, even though the maturity could be longer if the issuer does not exercise the
call. not usually give credit to the call in its model price.  This is
because the Bank would only have an outright holding of the
collateral in the event that the counterparty had defaulted, in
which case the counterparty would be unable to exercise the
call.
To discount the cash flows, the Bank uses market spreads
observed on comparator securities — where possible from the
same issuer — that most closely align with the underlying
liquidity, maturity and credit risk characteristics of the security
being model-priced.  If there is a risk characteristic in the
model-priced security that is not present in the comparator
securities, the spread may be adjusted further to reflect this.  
The Bank supplements its valuation process with a number of
cross-checks to ensure accuracy and consistency.  First, it
compares the valuations of securities with similar
characteristics.  This allows the identification of any securities
whose price appears out of line with peers, which can then be
investigated further and acted upon if required.  These peer
group comparisons are performed weekly by a valuations
review committee.  Second, it supplements its analysis with
market research and intelligence gathered from market
participants, and has also sought external advice on the
valuations assigned to securities.
The Bank does not publish its valuations of securities, because
that might risk the Bank being used as a pricing reference
source, which could distort the market and hinder the price
discovery process.  But an indication of the level of prices
assigned by the Bank to its collateral during the crisis is
shown in Chart 2.  The chart shows the weighted average
price assigned by the Bank to UK RMBS collateral.  Prices fell
during the second half of 2008 as financial systemic stress
intensified.  Since mid-2009 prices have risen as the market
has recovered.
Haircuts
The Bank does not lend an amount equal to the full value of
the collateral it takes.  To take additional protection and
reduce the likelihood that the Bank would incur a loss in the
event of a counterparty default, the Bank applies haircuts.
Haircuts can be thought of as loan to value (LTV) ratios,
analogous to those applied to mortgage lending to protect the
lender against falls in house prices.  For example, consider a
security with a nominal (par) value of 100 — this is what the
noteholders should be paid when the bond is redeemed — and
a current price of 90.  Assume that the haircut applied to that
security is 22% (the weighted average haircut applied to the
Bank’s SLS collateral), which is equivalent to an LTV ratio of
78%.  The Bank would then lend up to 90*(1 – 0.22) = 70.2
against that security.  But unlike mortgages, where the
maximum LTV ratio of the mortgage is set at origination but is
subsequently beyond the control of the lender (for example,
the LTV ratio will rise if house prices fall), the Bank’s daily
valuation and remargining process ensures that it continuously
maintains this buffer.
The Bank’s haircuts are designed to protect against both
market risk and fundamental credit risk.  This protection is
particularly important for less liquid securities that the Bank
might have to hold for a period of time before being able to
sell them, as there is then more time for such risks to
crystallise.
Market risk would crystallise if a counterparty defaulted and
the value of collateral then fell as a result of market
movements before it could be sold.  The haircut is designed to
absorb this potential reduction in value, so that the sale of the
collateral at the lower price would still be sufficient for the
Bank to recover the amount it is owed. 
Fundamental credit risk is the risk that the value of a security
may fall because of a deterioration in the credit quality of the
underlying assets.  For an RMBS security for example, there is
the risk that a large number of the borrowers default on the
underlying mortgages, which could result in the security
incurring a credit loss and noteholders not getting paid back in
full.  Haircuts are therefore also designed to absorb the
potential impact of such underlying credit losses.(1)
The total haircut applied to a security is comprised of two
elements:  (i) a standard ‘base’ haircut for that asset type, and
(ii) haircut add-ons to protect against additional risks,
including those that may be idiosyncratic to that security.  The
Bank may vary haircuts at its discretion, including those
applied to collateral it has already taken.












Chart 2 Weighted average price of UK RMBS
collateral(a)(b)
(a) Average prices of UK RMBS held as collateral, weighted by the size of holding.
(b) Data points are monthly moving averages.  Data are shown up to 30 April 2010.
(1) The valuations of securities reflect fundamental credit risk to some extent, but based
more on the expected performance of the underlying assets, whereas haircuts are
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Base haircuts
The Bank publishes base haircuts that it applies to different
asset types, reflecting their different risk characteristics.(1) For
narrow collateral, haircuts start at 0.5 percentage points for
floating-rate or short-maturity fixed-rate securities.  For
extended collateral the base haircuts range from 12 percentage
points for floating-rate RMBS or covered bonds to
25 percentage points for floating-rate CMBS.  For fixed-rate
securities the haircuts also increase with maturity to mitigate
interest rate risk, which is the risk that market interest rates
rise, resulting in price falls for securities that pay a fixed rate of
interest.
For narrow sovereign and supranational collateral, the Bank
sets its haircuts on the basis of historic price volatility in
stressed periods, so that price falls should rarely exceed the
size of the haircut.  It does this by estimating potential price
falls using a Value-at-Risk (VaR) approach, assuming a five-day
holding period with a 99% confidence interval.  This means
that — based on historic price volatility in stressed periods —
the fall in value of a security would only be expected to exceed
the haircut once in a hundred five-day periods.  The Bank uses
a five-day holding period as it expects it would be able to sell
such collateral within this time frame given its liquidity.  The
Bank uses at least ten years of price-volatility data and
determines the 99% confidence interval based on the most
volatile two-year period within that, in order to minimise both
the risk of its haircuts proving inadequate, and the likelihood of
needing to increase haircuts at a time of market stress.
For extended collateral such as RMBS, the Bank uses
stressed-scenario analyses, rather than a stressed VaR
approach, to set its haircuts.  This is because in the wake of a
counterparty bank defaulting, the value of such private sector
securities — particularly those associated with banks — is likely
to fall by more than historic price volatility might suggest.  To
estimate market risk in extended collateral the Bank considers
the following indicators (illustrated for the case of RMBS):
￿ observed historical price falls following particular events —
to capture the impact of actual events on RMBS prices;
￿ the difference in price between various eligible RMBS — to
measure the range of prices and so estimate how far prices
could conceivably fall;  and
￿ changes in the bid-offer spreads on eligible RMBS securities
— to measure the illiquidity in the RMBS market. 
As noted above, haircuts are also set to protect against price
falls resulting from a deterioration of the fundamental credit
quality of the collateral.  One way the Bank does this is to look
at the difference in price between AAA and lower-rated
securities of the same issuers, in order to estimate the impact
of a material change in the credit risk of a security.  A second
way the Bank assesses the adequacy of the protection haircuts
provide against fundamental credit risk is through the use of
stress tests, as discussed further below.
Haircut add-ons
The Bank applies additional haircuts to address risks that are
not accounted for by the base haircut.  These include standard
haircut add-ons for:
￿ non-sterling securities — 6 percentage point add-on to
address the exchange rate risk inherent in taking collateral
denominated in a different currency to that of the loan;(2)
￿ model-priced securities — 5 percentage point add-on to
account for both the risk that the model price may be an
overestimate of the true price and the lower liquidity that is
implied by the lack of a market price;  and
￿ own-name securities — 5 percentage point add-on to
address the correlation risk inherent in accepting securities
where the counterparty submitting them as collateral is
also the originator of the underlying assets.(3)
In addition to these standard haircut add-ons, the Bank may
apply further idiosyncratic add-ons to cover additional risks.
One example of this would be to account for any additional
correlation risks if the counterparty plays other roles in
connection with the security, not just that of the originator.
For example, the counterparty may provide bank accounts or
swaps to the special purpose vehicle issuer of the securities.
In the event that the counterparty defaults suddenly, the
noteholders could therefore have an exposure to the
counterparty, which could result in a loss.  The Bank may
apply an additional haircut to reflect this risk.
The Bank may also apply idiosyncratic haircut add-ons to
mitigate any concerns regarding the credit quality of the assets
underlying a security, based on the outcome of stress testing.
Stress testing
Stress testing plays a key role in assessing the adequacy of the
protection taken by the Bank and in determining haircuts.
Stress tests are applied to individual securities to determine
potential idiosyncratic haircut add-ons that may be required.
They are also used to size the base haircuts, which are designed
to provide sufficient protection against fundamental credit risk
for the majority of securities, with only a few higher-risk
securities requiring additional idiosyncratic add-ons.  Stress
tests are applied on an ongoing basis, for example for
securities which are flagged through the Bank’s monitoring
process as having potential performance issues.
(1) For details of current haircuts applied in the Bank’s operations, see
www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/money/notices.htm.
(2) In the US dollar repo operations, this haircut add-on is applied for non-dollar
denominated collateral.  The add-on for yen-denominated collateral is 8 percentage
points (in all operations).
(3) In future, own-name securities will not be eligible for use as collateral in the Bank’s
long-term repo operations, but will remain eligible for use in the DWF.100 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q2
The Bank has developed stress tests for different asset classes.
These follow the general approach of considering the impact of
stressed assumptions for default rates and losses given default
on the assets underlying a security.  For example, one stress
test for RMBS would be to assume stressed house price falls
together with additional costs associated with foreclosure.
Together with the LTV profile of the pool of mortgages, these
assumptions give an estimate of the stressed loss on the pool
for a given level of defaults.  For different securities, the Bank
might seek protection against different levels of defaults,
depending on the characteristics of the underlying mortgages
and borrowers.
Protection taken by the Bank
The article so far has discussed the principles that underpin the
Bank’s collateral risk management procedures.  Chart 3 brings
all of these together to show the actual protection taken by
the Bank through the aggregate valuations and haircuts
applied to collateral in the ELTRs and SLS.  By taking a greater
degree of protection against riskier, less liquid collateral, the
Bank seeks to take no more risk overall in accepting one form
of collateral over another.
The largest aggregate haircuts are applied to the collateral
taken in the SLS:  the weighted average haircut is 22%,
reflecting the fact that the majority of the collateral is in the
form of floating-rate RMBS and covered bonds (12 percentage
point base haircut) which are own-name (5 percentage point
haircut add-on) and model-priced (5 percentage point
add-on).  For a practical example of how the various layers of
protection combine to protect the Bank against loss at an
individual security level, see the box on page 101.
Emergency liquidity assistance and the risk
management of loans as collateral 
In addition to providing liquidity insurance through the public
facilities described in Table A, in exceptional circumstances the
Bank can act directly as lender of last resort to commercial
banks through bilateral arrangements, in order to prevent a
loss of confidence spreading through the financial system.  The
Bank extended such emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) to
two institutions, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and Halifax
Bank of Scotland (HBOS), in the autumn of 2008.  
ELA was provided to HBOS between 1 October 2008 and
16 January 2009, with use of the facility peaking at
£25.4 billion on 13 November 2008.  ELA was provided to RBS
between 7 October 2008 and 16 December 2008, with usage
peaking at £36.6 billion on 17 October 2008.  The banks were
charged fees for the use of the facilities.(1)
The collateral taken by the Bank in respect of this facility
included various forms of raw (ie non-securitised) loans,
including pools of mortgages, personal loans and loans to
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), as shown in
Chart 4.
The Bank risk-managed the collateral using the same principles
of eligibility, valuations and haircuts applied to the collateral
accepted in its public facilities so as to ensure it took an
equivalent level of protection.  To this end, the Bank accepted

















Chart 4 Loan collateral taken in the ELAs to RBS and
HBOS(a)
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Narrow collateral Extended collateral
ELTRs SLS
Percentages of nominal value 
Nominal value of collateral
Market value of collateral
Haircut-adjusted value of collateral
£62bn
Chart 3 Protection taken in the ELTRs and SLS at their
peak usage(a)(b)(c)(d)
(a) Data are for the respective peaks of usage:  9 January 2009 for the ELTRs, 30 January 2009
for the SLS.  Actual amounts are shown above the bar.
(b) Note that the figures for the total haircut-adjusted value of collateral (£185 billion for the
ELTRs, £190 billion for the SLS) are slightly higher than the figures for the amount lent in
Table A.  This reflects the fact that counterparties tend to submit slightly more collateral
than the minimum required.
(c) The majority of the narrow collateral (84%) was sterling-denominated UK government debt.
(d) Haircuts for narrow collateral have subsequently been increased (see
www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/marketnotice090925.pdf).  Haircuts currently applied to
narrow collateral range from 0.5% for floating-rate or short-maturity fixed-rate sterling
securities to 13.5% for fixed-rate non-sterling securities with greater than 30 years to
maturity. 
(1) For further details of the ELAs, including the fees charged, see Bank of England
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A practical example of how the Bank is
protected against loss
This box uses a hypothetical mortgage-backed security to
demonstrate how the various layers of protection combine
to protect the Bank against loss.  Consider an RMBS
transaction backed by a pool of 1,000 mortgages, each of
£100,000.  In this example, the £100 million pool of
mortgages might support the issuance of, say, £90 million of
‘senior’ notes and £10 million of ‘subordinated’ notes.  This
means that the senior notes benefit from credit enhancement
of 10% (a typical figure for actual RMBS), so that the first 10%
of losses on the mortgages are not absorbed by the senior
noteholders, but are absorbed by the subordinated
noteholders.  It is only the senior notes that would potentially
be eligible for use as collateral with the Bank, provided they
met the Bank’s eligibility criteria, including having been rated
AAA at issue.
In addition to this credit enhancement, further protection is
provided by the fact that the mortgages are themselves
secured loans, backed by properties worth more, in general,
than the value of loans.  So to suffer 10% of actual losses on
the mortgage pool would require more than 10% of the
borrowers to default on their mortgages.  
Chart A illustrates the various layers of protection for this
example, assuming that the weighted average LTV ratio for the
mortgages is 75% (a typical figure for an RMBS mortgage
pool), the price assigned to the security is 90, and the haircut
applied is 12%.(1) The final three bars are equivalent to the bars
shown for the ELTRs and the SLS in Chart 3 and reflect the
protection taken by the Bank through its valuation and haircut.
The differences between the first three bars reflect the
protection built in to the security itself.
In this case, the Bank would be prepared to lend up to
£71 million against the collateral with a nominal value of
£90 million and ultimately backed by properties worth
£133 million.  This means the Bank would be protected against
a significant deterioration in the fundamental credit quality of
the collateral, so that it would only be at risk of suffering a
credit loss under very extreme stress scenarios.  For example,
consider a simplified stress test with the severely stressed
assumptions of a 50% house price fall, and foreclosure costs
(including repossession costs and foregone interest) of 40% of
the outstanding loan amount.  Assume also that every
mortgage has an LTV ratio of 75% (in reality, the pool would
have a distribution of LTV ratios).  Under these assumptions
the senior notes would only incur a loss if more than 14% of
the underlying borrowers defaulted (Table 1).  Further, with
the additional protection taken by the Bank through its
valuation and haircut, the Bank would only suffer a loss if more
than 39% of the borrowers defaulted.
The Bank’s haircuts are also intended to protect against market
risk, not just fundamental credit risk.  Indeed, following a
counterparty default the Bank would plan to sell the collateral
in due course (subject to market conditions) rather than hold it
to maturity, not least because it is not the Bank’s role to
provide long-term funding to the economy by holding private
sector collateral on its balance sheet.  The degree of protection
against fundamental credit risk highlighted above implies that
the collateral would make an attractive investment to
investors.  This should help to ensure that the Bank would
indeed be able to sell the collateral — at a price at which it
would not suffer a loss even if there had been some
deterioration in the performance of the underlying assets — so
that the Bank would only need to hold the collateral until any






























Chart A Lending against RMBS — an example
Table 1 Stressed loss analysis(a)
Property value: £133,333
Size of mortgage loan: £100,000
Value of property after 50% price fall: £66,667
Recovery from repossession and sale £66,667 – £40,000
of property, net of 40% foreclosure costs: = £26,667 
Loss given default: (£100,000 – £26,667)/
£100,000 = 73% 
Senior note  Protection against loss: 10% 
protection Proportion of borrowers that can default 10%/0.73 = 14%
given the protection against loss:
Bank’s  Protection against loss: 29%
protection Proportion of borrowers that can default  29%/0.73 = 39%
given the protection against loss:
(a) Some calculations affected by rounding.
(1) 12% is the base haircut applied to RMBS.  With haircut add-ons, the total haircut
applied to an RMBS security could be much higher.  For example, if the security was
own-name, model-priced and non-sterling, the haircut would be 28%.  But those
additional haircut components are designed to protect against specific incremental
risks that are not considered in this simple example, which instead just illustrates the
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securitised format in its public facilities such as the ELTRs.  The
Bank applied a haircut to each pool of loans comprised of the
following three elements, which can be viewed as the
equivalent of the steps between the final four bars in Chart A
in the box on page 101:
￿ ‘AAA haircut’ — to replicate the credit enhancement
inherent in a typical AAA securitisation of that loan type, to
bring the credit protection up to broadly the AAA level;
￿ ‘valuation haircut’ — based on the valuations of
securitisations backed by similar loans, to replicate the
effect of a market price (given that the loans were not
tradable instruments they did not have market prices);  and
￿ ‘conventional haircuts’ — applied based on the haircuts
applied to equivalent securitisations in the ELTRs.  For
example, pools of mortgages attracted the same
12 percentage point base haircut applied to RMBS.
Additional haircuts were applied for own-name risk and
model-price risk, with further add-ons applied to account
for any idiosyncratic risks in the loan pools, such as limited
availability of data on the loans.  The Bank also used stress
tests to ensure the adequacy of the protection provided by
the haircuts.  
This resulted in total effective haircuts (relative to the nominal
value of the loans) across their loan collateral portfolios of
49% for RBS and 48% for HBOS.  The total haircut provided a
significant degree of protection in both cases, broadly
comparable to the total protection taken in the Bank’s other
operations.  In the SLS for example (Chart 3), the amount that
the Bank would lend (£190 billion) was around 34% less than
the nominal value of the collateral (£287 billion).  Assuming
additional credit enhancement built in to the collateral (ie a
‘AAA haircut’) of, say, 10%, the nominal value of the loans
underlying the collateral securities would have been around
£319 billion, so that the equivalent total ‘effective haircut’
relative to this amount, under that assumption, would have
been around 40%. 
Future developments
For liquidity insurance to be effective it is important that the
range of collateral accepted is wide enough that the
commercial banks have sufficient collateral to borrow against
in stressed circumstances.  To this end, the Bank has proposed
to extend the range of collateral accepted in the DWF to
include loans in addition to securities, so that a significant
proportion of banks’ assets would in principle be eligible as
collateral with the Bank (see Bank of England (2010a)).  Even
with large haircuts to protect itself against risk, this should
help ensure that the Bank can provide the liquidity necessary
to support financial stability, including in stressed
circumstances.
As described above in the context of the ELA, loans accepted
as collateral in the DWF would be risk-managed using the
same principles as for securities:  the aim would be for the
Bank’s risk tolerance to be broadly the same for loans as for a
securitisation of those same loans, so as not to provide
incentives to submit one form of collateral over the other.
Indicative haircuts that would be applied to loans accepted as
collateral range from 25%–60% depending on the type of loan
(see Bank of England (2010a)).   
Conclusion
At times of financial stress, the Bank’s provision of liquidity
insurance plays a crucial role in containing the impact of stress
on the broader economy.  But — in keeping with Bagehot —
central banks should only provide that liquidity insurance
against good collateral and at a penalty rate.  That is also
consistent with the need to minimise the risk taken onto the
Bank’s balance sheet.
The Bank’s conservative approach to risk management means
that it takes a significant degree of protection in its operations.
In particular, given its approach to collateral valuations and
haircuts, the Bank should be at risk of suffering a loss only
under very extreme stress scenarios.  Together with the rates
paid for borrowing in its facilities (designed to ensure that the
Bank remains lender of last resort) they ensure that the Bank
does not provide liquidity on generous terms.  In particular,
given the higher haircuts and rates paid for borrowing against
less liquid collateral, the Bank seeks not to provide liquidity
against extended collateral on more generous terms than
against narrow collateral.
Collateral risk management plays a central role in ensuring the
effectiveness of the Bank’s liquidity insurance operations.  The
Bank keeps its collateral policy under continuous review to
ensure risks continue to be managed and mitigated, and the
Bank’s balance sheet protected.Research and analysis Collateral risk management at the Bank of England 103
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